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A B S T R A C T
This paper develops a framework for characterising tentative and definitive governance modes. Using investor
financing of UK-based therapeutic biotech firms as a context, the paper traces how policy makers have blended
tentative and definitive elements in the design and implementation of six different kinds of policies to spur
investor support for these firms. We find that tentative and definitive governance are used together to balance
the need for certainty with necessary responsiveness to the dynamic circumstances that surround technological
emergence. Moreover we show that the relative use of tentative and definitive modes is shaped as much by
higher landscape-level influences as by technology or sector-level factors. Challenges are also identified, for
instance, how to maintain synergistic rather than either/or relationships between state and non-state actors
when both hesitate to engage with markets at different times.
1. Introduction
This paper explores state governance of emerging technologies that
are expected to exert a considerable socio-economic impact (Rotolo
et al., 2015: 1830). Whilst these fields may exhibit a degree of co-
herence in ‘the composition of actors, institutions and [their] patterns
of interactions’, their prospects are essentially ‘uncertain and ambig-
uous’ (Rotolo et al., 2015). The paper deals with the challenge faced by
the state in constructing policy designed to draw in private investment
to unproven fields where uncertainty makes it difficult for actors to
provide the required resources or place the right ‘bets’ to deliver pro-
mising solutions to societal needs (Wong, 2011, Nuffield, 2013).
Private investors in emerging technologies are expected to make
long term, illiquid investments under high uncertainty while being
subject to information asymmetries, moral hazards, and potential tax
issues (Westhead and Storey, 1997; Hall, 2002; Revest and Sapio, 2008;
BVCA-NESTA, 2009). Under these conditions investors rarely provide
the levels of investment sought by firms and expected by governments
(Bell, 2017; Hughes, 2013). As a result, in the USA, Europe, and Asia
policy makers have chosen to make repeated interventions to address
market failure with respect to investments in emerging technologies,
such as biotechnology, often with limited success (Hopkins et al., 2007;
Orsenigo, 2016; Wong, 2011).
Policy makers can attempt to improve their performance through
governance responses that are explorative, experimental, reflexive,
flexible, adaptive, open and dynamic when dealing with uncertainty
(Kuhlmann et al., 2019). When governance practices respond to, and
are shaped by, emerging inter-dependencies and contingencies in a
flexible and preliminary manner they can be characterised as tentative,
and contrasted with definitive governance, which is more prescriptive
and persistent (Kuhlmann et al., 2019). Definitive governance is ob-
served when policies move along decisive paths to accomplish specific
objectives, while tentative governance is observed when policies have
less specific outcomes (Kuhlmann et al., 2019).
This paper fosters a deeper understanding of the utility of these two
different modes of governance; in particular we explore how tentative
and definitive modes of policy making operate to assist the formation,
financing and sharing of knowledge among firms supporting emerging
technologies in the UK therapeutic biotech sector. In this context, we
observe that the relationship between tentative and definitive modes of
governance is mediated not just by uncertainty, but also by a desire to
learn and create better policy instruments, and also to forge agreements
between stakeholders with differing perspectives.
The first research question is how to unpack what is meant by de-
finitive versus tentative governance? This is addressed by identifying
seven relevant policy dimensions that span the descriptive “where,
when, what and who” aspects of a given policy instrument. Our analysis
will suggest that whilst these dimensions are conceptually clear and
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coherent - in practice a policy could be tentative along one dimension
but definitive along another. For example, a policy by the state with
very clear goals to support a specific group of firms for a given period of
time could be classified as definitive in its targeting, but tentative be-
cause of the small amount of money allocated and/or the shortness of
the intervention’s duration.
This leads to our core second research question, how are policies for
an emergent technology actually formulated and implemented? Is there
a coherent pattern across the governance dimensions. For instance, are
policies with a definitive purpose typically executed in a definitive
manner; or is it common that the different dimensions are differently
executed, as hinted above?. And if there is dissonance, is it clear why
this is the case?
This leads to our third research question: How are definitive and
tentative governance modes used over time to support an emerging
technology? Do policies in the early stages of a sector’s development
start with governance having many tentative elements while actors
learn, before a shift to more definitive policies (as one would expect
with a simple adaptive bottom-up learning approach). Or is the gov-
ernance of policy the result of broad attitudes of the prevailing gov-
ernment of the day (as one would expect with a top-down intentionality
of political philosophy)? Or are wider landscape-level forces influen-
tial?
To explore how policy makers use tentative and definitive govern-
ance in the context of emerging technologies, we use a longitudinal
approach, covering the history of the UK therapeutic biotech industrial
sector from 1980 to the present day. We explore changes to the pre-
vailing modes of governance for policy instruments that have (1) set up
new firms (2) supplied tax incentives to investors (3) supported colla-
borative R&D initiatives (4) set up hybrid funding schemes that join
state monies with those of private investors (5) set up directed tech-
nology development initiatives and (6) formulated coordinated in-
dustrial strategies.
Studying these six policy initiatives in the UK biotech sector over
this long history provides a rich context for theorizing about definitive
and tentative modes of governance for emerging technologies and al-
lows us to draw out a number of lessons. These are discussed in detail at
the end of the paper, but can be broadly summarized as follows: ten-
tative and definitive governance should not be treated as being in op-
position. Instead tentative governance appears to have broad utility in
policy, and there appears to be an overlap in usage and a dynamic in-
teraction between tentative and definitive modes. Looking at how po-
licies unfold over time, we argue that technological development and
political will do not have a strong influence on the choice of mode.
Rather governance mode appears to be the outcome of a complex in-
terplay between actors in government (at the department level), with
firms, investors and the economic context playing a particularly strong
role in the final outcomes.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 synthesizes
conceptual material to generate a framework for identifying and clas-
sifying governance actions, so that trends can be revealed and analysed.
Section 3 outlines the main sources and methods used for of the em-
pirical analysis. Section 4 provides the empirical study of four decades
of changes in governance. Section 5 discusses how and when tentative
and definitive governance modes are applied, and draws implications.
2. A framework for exploring tentative and definitive governance
To explore the dynamic interaction between tentative governance
and definitive governance, some initial steps must be taken. First, we
need to identify relevant actors and understand their role in relation to
a specific governance issue. Secondly, we need to characterise their
actions with regard to the different dimensions of tentative/definitive
governance. Together these two steps provide the basis for tracking the
interplay between the two forms of governance over time, allowing
insights into their perceived utility and a basis from which to reflect on
their consequences.
2.1. Relevant actors in governance and their roles
Drawing on the traditional economic distinction between markets
and hierarchies, evidence suggests that, in recent decades, globalisation
has led to a shift in the balance of power away from government
hierarchies to wider policy making networks with more actors involved
(Braithwaite, 2009). Yet at the same time the state has grown, rather
than shrunk, driving interest in ‘regulatory capitalism’ (Levi-Faur,
2005, 2006, Braithwaite, 2009). The unique capabilities of the state are
relevant to consider in relation to this growth. The state can create laws
and regulations, relocate resources and risks across the economy and
through time; and it can investigate, call to account and punish those
not in compliance with legislation (Braithwaite, 2009; Moss, 2002). The
state can also spread risks by creating ‘social contracts’ that bind future
generations, act as a trusted third party, reducing uncertainty and
structuring public expectations about regulatory regimes, risk levels
and future technological outcomes (Moss, 2002; Hopkins and
Nightingale, 2006; The Royal Society, 1992). The state’s capabilities are
particularly prescient in relation to emerging technologies and the
shaping of markets associated with them (McLeish and Nightingale,
2009; Lyall et al., 2009; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2013;
Mazzucato, 2013).
Where an innovation supports key state functions, governments can
work with firms to sponsor development or even develop new tech-
nologies themselves (e.g. in defence). State involvement may be high
during innovations’ early stages, when uncertainties are high (Pavitt,
1999; Wong, 2011) and with systemic technologies whose costs, risks
and complexity are beyond the resources of firms to manage (e.g. nu-
clear power) (Scranton, 2006). However, government interventions can
be problematic: they may reflect technology-push from lobbies, focus
on big technology jumps with limited market assessment, or lead to
commitments that are difficult to abandon (Pavitt, 1999). States have
often failed when they have attempted to ‘pick winners’ with emerging
technologies (e.g. in UK programmes for supersonic transport or nu-
clear reactors), although elsewhere successful interventions such as
Airbus, suggest some heterogeneity in results (Owen, 1999). Interven-
tions can also attract a lot of damaging criticism of the state for in-
effectiveness and ‘meddling’ where large investments do not seem to
have paid off (Mazzucato, 2013).
While the state can be expected to take policy action to support its
key functions, firms can be expected to seek profits by addressing
emerging demands (and even anticipating them). This could include
performing governance functions that are either delegated or necessi-
tated by state inaction (van Zwanenberg et al., 2011; Braithwaite, 2009;
Francis, 1993). However, firms have different interests and capabilities
to the state. Their actions are guided by market opportunities for profit
and this leads to underinvestment in areas where profits are not ex-
pected or where spillover and free rider effects will reduce rewards
from investing (Lacasa et al., 2004; Lazonick, 1993; Salter and Martin,
2001). This is not to say that firms cannot invest for the long term -
quite substantial R&D investments can be made where they expect good
commercial returns (Eads and Nelson, 1971; Jewkes et al., 1969); they
even invest in basic research (Rosenberg, 1990). However firms typi-
cally only make such commitments after key technical and market
uncertainties are reduced as a result of state interventions (Wong, 2011;
Mazzucato, 2013). Firms can also retreat from previously profitable
markets when economic conditions change, leaving the state to step in
once again, e.g. in the market for debt during economic recessions
(Reinhart et al., 2011).
In summary, the state plays a key role fostering private activity in
support of emerging technologies – that may include delegating some
important technological development functions to the private sector.
But there are also limits to this substitution and the need for flexibility,
as at some moments the private sector may fail to be effective, and at
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other moments it is the state that can be lacking. For example, if the
state leaves provision of a function to private actors (e.g. during times
of fiscal constraints) it might have to move back in to fulfil that function
if firms subsequently retreat and market failure occurs.
2.2. Identifying and following relevant governance actions
Before we delve into the details of policy actions, we need to locate
the initiatives that we have to analyse. In this respect, it is important to
note that determining the boundary of a governance regime for ana-
lytical purposes is challenging (Rogge and Reichardt, 2016). Not all
actions by relevant (that is influential) government actors will be di-
rected at the emerging technology studied, and not all relevant actions
may be immediately apparent to the functioning of a system (indeed
these influences may be international or cross-sectoral - Hekkert et al.,
2007; Hopkins et al., 2013). Governance interventions may be targeted
at a particular domain – be it sectoral or technological – in which case
these may be referred to as ‘focused or vertical’ policies (Lacasa et al.,
2004). Alternatively, interventions may be intended to address a par-
ticular challenge across all the sectors within a geography - so called
‘general or horizontal’ policies (ibid). So in our review of governance
mechanisms we need to take account of both the vertical (focused) as
well as the horizontal (general) policies, even though the influence of
any given policy on a system may be difficult to discern (Rogge and
Reichardt, 2016).
We must also recognise that whilst the ultimate aim of the state may
be to encourage firms to invest in the design and development of new
technologies, there are many routes by which this may be achieved. The
mapping of state actions onto particular functions in a technology’s
innovation system is an important approach to chart the dynamics of
these systems (Hekkert and Negro, 2009). In Section 4, this paper ex-
amines a broad range of government policies that stretch from direct
investment and ownership of firms, to assisting financing of firms, to
helping build a knowledge sharing eco-system for the industry. These
different situations can be characterised as different governance func-
tions or niches. Our characterization of these governance niches, as op-
portunities for policy interventions to act as levers on technological
emergence, draws on the literature on innovation systems. This litera-
ture suggests that a relatively small number of functions are required to
support technological emergence (Edquist, 2005; Hekkert et al., 2007).
These include (i) entrepreneurial activities (ii) knowledge development
(iii) knowledge diffusion (iv) guidance of search (v) market formation
(vi) resource mobilisation and (vii) support from advocacy coalitions
(Hekker et al. 2007).
In our empirical work, we will classify our policy initiatives along
the above two dimensions to locate their context, and our sample de-
liberately selects a wide range of policies as seen from these two di-
mensions.
2.3. Characterisation of tentative and definitive governance modes
Governance can be considered as ‘tentative’ in mode when ‘it is
designed (practiced, exercised or evolves) as a dynamic process to
manage interdependencies and contingencies in a non-finalizing way;
rather prudent (e.g. trial and error, or learning processes in general)
and preliminary (e.g. temporally limited) than assertive and persistent’
(Kuhlmann et al., 2019). Definitive governance can be thought of as the
opposite mode, practiced in a more assertive manner, seeking to steer a
deliberate, predictable course. While these two poles are intuitively
distinct, we suggest that in practice classifying a policy along these lines
must consider the different dimensions of the policy. Thus any given
policy action can be characterised as tentative or definitive in different
dimensions independently.
Table 1 provides a set of possible dimensions upon which policy
actions can be plotted. The dimensions chosen reflect standard de-
scriptive situational variables: where, how, when, what, and who (the
why – is a common/ constant in this study: each policy is aimed at
improving the environment for firms seeking finance to support their R
&D activities). Dimensions are further informed by Kuhlmann et al.
(2019) - with the notable additions of a dimension that focuses on the
breadth /narrowness of the policy target and a dimension to reflect the
scope of the intervention across Hekkert et al.’s TIS functions. The
former is a helpful and necessary addition as it distinguishes broad
(horizontal) versus narrowly focused (vertical) governance measures, as
discussed above, while the latter positions governance interventions
within in the innovation system.
Table 1 demonstrates that there are many different dimensions for
characterizing policy actions as relatively more or less tentative. An
obvious analytical implication of our framing is that to understand the
frequency and incidence of tentative governance a detailed analysis has
to consider multiple perspectives. In the following sections the gov-
ernance of entrepreneurial finance for emerging UK therapeutics firms
is explored drawing on the above framework, in order to understand
exactly what is happening.
3. Research method
This explorative paper traces how the state has acted to shape the
UK’s market for entrepreneurial finance to support the commerciali-
zation of a specific emerging technology – namely biotechnology. It
adopts a longitudinal approach to explore a time period of around 40
years, allowing for observation of governance from the emergence of
the first UK biotech firms up to the present.
3.1. Empirical focus
Entrepreneurial firms play a key role in the commercialization of
emerging technologies (Freeman and Soete, 1997). The enduring em-
phasis on the financing of such firms in policy discourse confirms their
crucial importance as a governance focus in relation to commerciali-
sation of novel technologies in the life sciences (ACARD, 1980;
Bioscience, Innovation and Growth Team (BIGT, 2003, 2009, Office for
Life Sciences 2017). It is possible for biotechnology-based businesses to
take many forms but those that seek to develop novel therapeutics are
at the extreme end of equity finance-hungry firms in the sector
(Hopkins, 2012). Sector-specific policy has often focused more in-
tensively on these firms rather than other forms of biotechnology (for
example see recent criticism of the UK sector’s industrial strategy in a
report by the House of Lords Science and Technology Committee,
2018). By following prominent governance actions, this paper also
follows this same focus to the exclusion of areas of technological ap-
plication beyond medicinal drugs. The term ‘therapeutic biotech firm’ is
used here to refer to commercial organisations established after the
emergence of novel biotechnologies in the 1970s, seeking to bring
medicines to market (in keeping with prior work – see Hopkins et al.,
2013). The maintenance of the prior-established pharmaceutical in-
dustry is also an important concern for UK policy makers given its high
contribution to the economy, in terms of jobs, exports and gross value-
added (PWC, 2017). The role of ‘big pharma’ in the commercialization
of emerging technologies is beyond the scope of this paper as the focus
is on emerging firms. Big pharma firms are mentioned only where they
have been influential in the shaping of governance relating to the fi-
nancing of their smaller contemporaries.
3.2. Historical process study
This paper follows the development, implementation and adapta-
tion of policy instruments affecting firm development, including im-
portant policies that influence the equity financing market for UK
therapeutic biotech firms. It draws on contemporaneous materials
wherever possible as these are superior to retrospective interviews
(Soderqvist, 1997). Archival sources used include company annual
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reports and accounts, government policy documents, reports by pro-
fessional service firms, press releases and articles from the financial
press and specialist trade journals. Extensive use is also made of de-
tailed prior studies by scholars of the UK biotechnology sector, and
entrepreneurial finance (as cited).
Wider context is provided from prior research, based on methods
discussed by Hopkins et al. (2013) and Owen and Hopkins (2016).
Hopkins et al. (2013) provides quantitative analysis of key financial
trends. Owen and Hopkins (2016) identify key institutional and firm-
level events that have been influential on the evolution of the sector.
Findings from these studies are synthesised in Fig. 1.
3.3. Characterisation of policy instruments
In order to explore the dynamic interplay of tentative and definitive
governance modes during technological emergence, we have selected
six examples that span four governance niches associated with the four
technology innovation system functions that form a virtuous cycle
driving one ‘motor’ for the resourcing of technological change. These
functions are: (i) allocation of resources, (ii) knowledge creation, (iii) en-
trepreneurial activities, and (iv) legitimise/lobby (Hekkert et al., 2007).
Within these governance niches examples of specific policy instru-
ments, such as incentives for investors, direct subsidies, forming new
firms, encouraging knowledge sharing, have been purposely selected to
demonstrate governance practices covering the full period studied, with
the aim of illustrating a narrative – developed elsewhere – that the use
of industrial policy for this sector was neglected in the UK for much of
the 1980s and 1990s but has been making a return in more recent years
(Owen and Hopkins, 2016).
The characteristics of governance activities are described in Tables 2
and 3, which further expands on the dimensions introduced in Table 1
(and a more detailed picture of the actual characterisation of six policy
initiatives using this scheme is shown in the discussion section). As
indicated in Table 3, the governance mode of each instrument is as-
sessed over seven dimensions, with each being graded as either: (i)
tentative, (ii) more tentative than definitive, (iii) more definitive than
tentative or (iv) definitive. Given the inherent subjectivity of such
characterisation decisions, at least two authors have considered each
grading decision for each dimension of each instrument characterised.
To add further consistency grades are not assigned in an absolute sense,
but rather in direct comparison to the five other instruments studied
here. Thus an instrument assigned the grade of ‘tentative’ in one di-
mension of Table 1 is more tentative than most other instruments we
discuss, but could conceivably have been graded as ‘more tentative than
definitive’ against examples that were more tentative still, had these
been studied also.
4. Empirical findings
Section 4.1. provides context by showing the rise and fall of investor
support for the UK therapeutic biotech sector over the period studied.
Section 4.2 uses three policy instrument exemplars to demonstrate how
the UK government disengaged from interventionist policies in favour
of more tentatively targeted approaches. Using a further three policy
instruments, Section 4.3 demonstrates how the government returned to
interventionist policies in order to provide support after a sustained
period of lower-than-expected support in the sector by private in-
vestors.
4.1. Section 4.1
The growth of the UK biotech sector is illustrated by Fig. 1 which
shows annual firm foundation rates based on an industry database de-
veloped by Hopkins et al. (2013) and combined with key milestones in
institutional change taken from a detailed history of the national sector
(Owen and Hopkins, 2016). The Figure shows the rate of firm entry
gathering momentum in the 1980s before strengthening in the 1990s.
The trend line showing the number of firms receiving their first Venture
Capital (VC) funding round per annum closely tracks the trend for
foundations (most firms attracted VC investment with many receiving
this in their early years). Both lines appear to fall sharply in the final
years of coverage - an artefact due to lag effects in databases. However
the trend-line on stock market IPOs is not subject to this lag effect (the
more established nature of firms undergoing IPOs ensures faster de-
tection). This trend-line indicates that by the mid-1990s more firms
were being founded than VC funds or IPOs would support. Furthermore,
IPOs for therapeutic biotech firms were becoming scarce in the mid-
2000s, fell to zero during the global financial crisis and remained at
zero in the UK for some years in its aftermath (also visible in Fig. 4
which covers later years as well).
Fall in investor support for UK biotech firms needs to be seen against
generally improving institutional conditions for entrepreneurial finan-
cing in the UK. When the UK biotech sector gradually emerged in the
1980s, there was little venture capital (VC) in the country and the only
accessible trading platform for shares in such firms was the Unlisted
Securities Market (USM) - a lightly regulated junior stock market. This
situation changed as the development of an institutional framework for
entrepreneurial equity financing was strongly encouraged by govern-
ment.
In the early 1990s, as the US biotech sector boomed, the London
Stock Exchange’s (LSE) strict regulations were amended to allow shares
in loss-making UK biotech firms to be publically traded, matching the
practices of the rival American NASDAQ exchange (Owen and Hopkins,
2016). Further stock markets opened in the mid-1990s including Lon-
don's Alternative Investment Market (AIM) and the Brussels-based
EASDAQ, providing additional sources of equity for high risk
Table 1
Seven dimensions of tentative and definitive governance modes.
Source: Authors elaboration drawing on Hekkert et al. (2007), Kuhlmann et al. (2019), and Lacassa et al. (2004).
Examples of more tentative governance Examples of more definitive governance
What is being targeted? (governance niches
following Hekkert et al.’s TIS functions)
Unfettered knowledge creation Providing money directly for investment
Where is the target for governance? Horizontal (or general): Avoids singling out a narrowly
defined group, sector or activity to be governed.
Vertical (or focussed): Specific measures deployed for
governance of a clearly defined group, or activity.
How do governance processes operate? Emergent and evolving based on experiment, and
evaluation of experience
Pre-determined or fixed processes that can be relied upon
not to change
How much resource is committed? Commitment is minor due to uncertainties or pending
developments
Commitment is extensive in recognition of established
needs
When is support available? Time limited/ reversible Persistent/ permanent
What are the goals to be achieved? Goals are changing/ and goal selection is flexible Goals are fixed and unchanging
Who are the stakeholders involved in governance
formulation?
Open/ potentially extensive involvement of stakeholders
at a high level.
Closed/ potentially narrow consultation with little room
for input
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investments including emerging biotech firms. The potential to exit
their biotech investments via the LSE positively influenced VC funds’
commitment to the sector (E&Y, 1997). Similarly, stock market in-
vestors were more likely to support VC-backed biotech firms, sug-
gesting a certification effect (Hopkins et al., 2013).
After a honeymoon period, stock market confidence was shaken by
product failures during clinical development at several high profile
biotech companies in the late 1990s. During this period, IPOs fell short
of targeted values reflecting an investor “feeding frenzy followed by a
slump” (Davidson, 1998).
As non-specialist stock market investors lost confidence in the
sector, a few specialist VC funds remained committed, and even in-
creased their funding in individual biotech firms. The difference in
support provided by VC and stock market investors is reflected in
Figs. 2 and 3. The VCs undertook more numerous and larger deals over
time while stock markets facilitated more numerous but lower-value
deals. After the 2008 financial crisis, VCs had to make larger invest-
ments to maintain the required funding in investee firms that stock
markets would not support. The lack of stock market interest in
supporting new biotech IPOs meant VC funds were forced to accept
lower returns and higher risk as they had to support their existing
portfolio companies for longer than they might otherwise have done,
while biotech firms suffered from more ‘drip feeding’ of cash (E&Y,
2003, 2004; E&Y, 2005, 2007; E&Y, 2008, 2009). With stock markets
not supplying profitable exits for VCs, trade sales of investee firms to
more established drug developers became more common (E&Y, 1999).
This trend continued in the 2000s (Hopkins et al., 2013). Foundations
per year declined and activity in the sector began to contract (see
Fig. 1). Investor interest in UK biotech investing was further curtailed
by the global financial crisis in 2008 – a landscape-level event with
origins entirely unconnected to the sector. Stock-market interest in the
UK sector strongly recovered in 2014 but by then the state was already
moving to support the sector in much more interventionist ways (Owen
and Hopkins, 2016).
When one compares the UK situation with that of the USA, the
extent of the disadvantage that UK firms face becomes very apparent
and stark – see Fig. 4. To be precise, US biotech companies had market
capitalisations with a median in excess of $200 million most years
Fig. 1. Annual tally of foundations, initial VC funding rounds and stock market IPOs for UK Therapeutic Biotech firms and contextual events (1980–2009).
Source: Authors’ elaboration on figure from Hopkins et al. (2013) with milestone events identified in Owen and Hopkins (2016).
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between 2004 and 2013, whereas the comparative valuation for UK
companies was $74 million in 2004, with a subsequent and rapid de-
cline (note that Fig. 4 focuses on IPO valuations – while Fig. 3 focuses
on money raised in IPO and follow-on placing, explaining the dis-
crepancy in activity levels between the two figures).
The following sections illustrate how firms seeking equity financing,
and biotech firms specifically, had long been of policy interest. As the
financing predicament faced by these UK firms became more con-
cerning, policy commitments grew.
4.2. Governance in the 1980s: good-bye to definitive industrial policy
This section discusses three policy instruments with roots in the
1980s: state-funded Dedicated Biotech Firms (DBFs), tax incentives for
Venture Capital investors and grants for public-private R&D colla-
boration. The first targeted firm-specific intervention, but subsequent
instruments in the 1980s and 1990s were less focused on narrow sec-
toral targets (while still related to UK equity finance).
4.2.1. State-funded DBFs
This first policy instrument was deployed at the start of the 1980s
with the creation of Celltech, the UK’s first DBF, founded in 1980. A
second state-backed DBF, the Agricultural Genetics Company was
founded in 1983 (Owen and Hopkins, 2016). The former became a
flagship for the UK biotech sector, the latter was less successful.1 Here
we explore how a definitive governance intervention was rapidly
turned into a more tentative commitment following a change in poli-
tical environment.
Biotechnology became an emerging technology of substantial in-
terest to policy makers and investors around the world in the late 1970s
(Orsenigo, 1989). The UK state’s first move was the commissioning of a
report on the prospects of commercial exploitation of biotechnology in
the late 1970s, by the Advisory Council on Applied Research and De-
velopment (ACARD), authored by Alfred Spinks, Director of Research at
Imperial Chemical Industries, a large established chemical company.
Even though the Conservative government ignored almost all of
ACARD’s recommendations, one that was favoured was the re-
commendation to found a state-backed biotech firm to commercialise
public sector research – on the basis that the UK private sector was not
yet thought to be taking an adequate interest in the sector (Sharp,
1989).
Even before government approval, planning for founding Celltech
was undertaken within the National Enterprise Board (NEB), the state
agency responsible for nationalised firms and meeting some industry
financing needs (Sharp, 1989; Fairtlough, 1989). Founding such firms
was a tried and tested NEB formula in the UK under the Labour gov-
ernment, which had a record of creating national champions in stra-
tegically important sectors (Owen, 1999). In contrast, Thatcher’s in-
coming Conservative government favoured free market economics with
no role for the state in promoting emerging technologies, other than
funding the basic science and creating the right conditions to allow
private investors to do the rest (Sharp, 1989). Thatcher’s new govern-
ment now sought to brake from previous patterns of support.2
The highly targeted action of creating a particular firm to exploit
new technology is definitive in nature, but exploration of events around
Celltech’s founding suggest tentative governance was used too. There
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1 Agricultural biotechnology was less commercially successful in the UK and
perhaps as an indication of the government’s willingness to be tentative, AGC
seems to have been allowed to wither away.
2 This is illustrated by the treatment of Inmos, the Labour Government backed
semi-conductor firm, which received £25m from the National Enterprise Board
(NEB) in 1978. The new Conservative government begrudgingly met an out-
standing NEB commitment for further funding but then rapidly sold the com-
pany off to an industry incumbent (Owen, 1999).
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were protracted discussions and disputes involving several government
departments and agencies over two years during which time the plans
evolved (Dodgson, 1991). The state initially expected to fund Celltech
with £2M per year for five years (at 1980s prices), which the govern-
ment had been advised would be sufficient to test whether further in-
vestment was warranted and whether this should be private or public.
However, several commercial investors were then persuaded to invest
as well, reducing the State’s share of the investment and ownership
(down to 44%), so that Celltech rapidly became a jointly held public-
private company firmly under private control (Fairtlough, 1989;
Dodgson, 1991). Furthermore, Government pressured NEB to fully
disinvest as soon as was practical, selling all its shares by 1986
Table 3
Dimensional analysis of tentative and definitive governance modes used in six policy instruments (with shading indicating more definitive governance).
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(Dodgson, 1991).
A further illustration of the tentative nature of Celltech’s state
support is that it was drip-fed funding to ensure greater control for the
private investors over the direction of the company (Dodgson, 1991).
Celltech’s research programme can also be described as tentative rather
than definitive, with observers suggesting unfocused organization
meant it had more in common with a university than a corporate R&D
lab in its early years. For example, it did not finally settle on a ther-
apeutics-focused commercial strategy until 1985 (Dodgson, 1991). In-
deed the choice of therapeutic R&D over other possibilities was not
immediately obvious. Other early small UK firms founded to exploit
biotechnology were not initially focused on therapeutics either - ex-
ploring applications in diagnostics was more common (Sharp, 1985).
The case of Celltech shows how a narrowly targeted intervention
making a potentially open-ended commitment to an emerging tech-
nology was given more tentative characteristics. The state had in-
tervened firstly to allocate resources to a new emerging technology, and
also in effect, been poised to enter directly into entrepreneurial activity
albeit only underwriting the enterprise until commercial investors were
brought on board. Thus support for Celltech illustrates state governance
action across of two of Hekkert et al.’s seven functional niches (allo-
cation of resources and entrepreneurial activity). Despite some difficult
early years, Celltech gained the confidence of investors and remained
the largest UK biotech firm for nearly a quarter of a century. It even-
tually brought a series of medicines to market – although its greatest
commercial successes came following its takeover by Union Chimique
Belge (UCB) (Owen and Hopkins, 2016).
4.2.2. Tax incentives for venture capital investors3
Tax incentives for UK investors were introduced by the UK Treasury
in the early 1980s. These instruments are intended to encourage the
allocation of resources by private investors in favour of knowledge in-
tensive firms. This policy can be seen as tentative because government
did not focus on particular sectors or particular firms. Equally the in-
creasingly large financial commitment made through these instruments
and the Treasury’s long term commitment to them illustrates more
definitive elements in their governance.
In the early 1980s the VC sector was underdeveloped. By contrast
the US sector was well established and able to quickly support emerging
technologies such as biotechnology (Owen and Hopkins, 2016). One
long lived and much adapted line of policy instruments designed to
boost the availability of capital for entrepreneurial finance (including
VC funds) was established in 1981: the Business Start-up Scheme (BSS).
BSS had the goal of encouraging individuals to invest in starting their
own businesses by providing them with tax relief on sums invested of
up to £20,000 per annum (this rapidly jumped to £40,000, £100,000
and later £1m in subsequent schemes). BSS was highly novel but at-
tracted little investor interest and its design was flawed (Siepel, 2009).
It was redesigned and relaunched in 1983 as the Business Expansion
Scheme (BES) with the goal of incentivizing external investors to sup-
port high risk ventures, again in return for tax relief. Under close
government scrutiny, rules were soon changed in 1984 to avoid it be-
coming a tax shelter for consumers investing in low risk businesses such
as property investments. Yet restrictions to the scheme that could have
focused investment in high-technology firms were reversed due to
competing political goals and lobbying by the financial services in-
dustry – a pattern that was repeated as the scheme further evolved
(Siepel, 2009).
By 1988 £720m had been invested in over 2500 firms through BES.
The VC sector was suggested by the Chancellor to now be meeting
demand for capital from entrepreneurial firms. Yet BES was soon once
again being mainly used to support property investments. It was closed
in 1993 and replaced afterwards by the Enterprise Investment Scheme
(EIS), launched in 1994, and Venture Capital Trusts (VCT), launched in
1995. The former’s goal was to stimulate business angel investment in
start-ups, the latter’s was to support investment in more established
firms. EIS rules were less appealing to those without a high risk appetite
and there was low initial use of the scheme (only £25m of investment
capital was raised in its first two years) but this grew to over £600m by
2000 (Siepel, 2009). Although fund management companies were slow
to adapt to the new VCT scheme at first, VCTs are now a firmly es-
tablished vehicle for investment in small firms attracting >£350m
each year in the period 2010–2014, while EIS raised >£1Bn annually
over the same period (British Business Bank, 2015).
Like BES before them, VCTs were soon found to be supporting low
risk investments (while still providing investors with tax relief) rather
Fig. 2. The Dynamics of VC investment in UK therapeutics 1990-2009.
Source: Authors’ elaboration of data from Thompson one banker
Fig. 3. Dynamics of stock market investments (>£1m) in UK small ther-
apeutics firms 1987-2009.
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on data gathered from company reports
Fig. 4. Market Capitalisation of US and UK biotech firms at Initial Public
Offering.
Source: Authors analysis based on data published annually in ‘Public Biotech:
the numbers’ - Nature Biotechnology.
3 This section draws extensively on a comprehensive study of UK policy in this
area by Siepel (2009)
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than aiding high risk technology firms (Bank of England, 2001), but
mooted changes to the scheme were slow to emerge (Siepel, 2009). In
2015 EIS and VCT were reformed to provide greater incentives for in-
vestors willing to invest in ‘knowledge intensive’ firms and a 2018
consultation by HM Treasury was established to explore further tar-
geting with the aim of expanding capital raised to £20Bn for these firms
over the next decade (HM Treasury, 2018).
Throughout their long existence, this line of policy instruments has
been closely monitored by members of Parliament and the Government,
including the Chancellors of the day, the civil service, the financial
services industry and other business interest groups. There have been
regular stakeholder consultations and evaluations. Modifications have
been made to processes often. Failing schemes have been modified or
closed. In these respects EIS and VCT and their predecessors have been
tentatively governed. They have always been horizontally applied i.e.
these are sector and technology agnostic instruments– also a tentative
characteristic. Goals have also been changed in response to the eco-
nomic situation – a further tentative characteristic. However the
growing financial commitment of the state to these instruments (in
terms of tax revenues forgone) seems to have become more definitive
over time, even when they are reported to be a relatively expensive way
to create jobs (Siepel, 2009). In part this reflects the entrenched in-
terests of the financial services industry that has grown to depend on
these schemes.
Returning to the issue of biotech firms seeking VC, the impact of
these horizontal instruments was clear in that the investment en-
vironment was transformed (Sharp, 1989). Indeed by 1989, one firm,
British Biotechnology Ltd. had raised more than £30m in VC (Large,
1989; Kleinwort Benson Securities, 1992). Wider availability of VC
brought many UK biotech firms up to the levels of capitalization and
credibility needed to be considered by stock market investors, a de-
velopment that strongly supported the growth of the sector in the 1990s
(discussed previously in Section 4.1).
4.2.3. Grants for public-private R&D collaboration
The provision of grants for collaborative R&D discussed here act to
connect two important functions of innovation systems - knowledge
creation and entrepreneurial activities (Hekkert et al., 2007). This
provision can be seen as tentative governance in the sense that grants to
firms are individually small and the processes for offering these awards
have developed incrementally over time. Yet definitive elements are
observed too – including sustained support for the instrument over
time, relatively closed governance of awards and a considerable fi-
nancial commitment to collaborative R&D by the UK state over several
decades.
The focal policy instrument in this governance niche is the LINK
scheme, established at the end of the 1980s, and used across different
arms of the state (in the Department for Trade and Industry and by the
research councils – these run joint and separate LINK competitions).
LINK provides grant finance for R&D projects involving public and
private researchers, co-funded (50/50) by industry and the state. A
sister scheme (SMART) was also established to support industry-only
projects (BERR, 2008). LINK scheme funding supports a range of sectors
and was the most financially significant mode of targeted state-support
for UK biotech firms in the 1990s. During one 15 year period, LINK
distributed £50m to collaborative biotechnology research projects
(BERR, 2008:49). LINK was organised as a series of themed pro-
grammes each funding a number of projects. Several programmes fo-
cused on biotechnology. For example the applied genetics programme,
launched in 2000, funded 21 projects by distributing £28m over
8 years.4 Choice of topics for programmes was strongly influenced by
industry directly or (during the mid-1990s) via the UK’s technology
foresight process (Georghiou et al., 2010).5
Over the decades, generations of LINK and SMART programmes
were run as an institutionalised policy experiment with the many suc-
cessive programmes providing an opportunity for policy learning. Key
to LINK’s perceived success was that it addressed a market failure by
helping industrial partners to overcome their reluctance to invest in
early stage technologies where uncertainties are high (BERR, 2008).
Individual grants were small, but projects are commercially lead rather
than being steered by government or academics. LINK grants also be-
stowed a beneficial investor signalling effect on their commercial
partners (Siepel, 2009). In 2004 the government established the Tech-
nology Strategy Board (TSB) - later renamed Innovate UK and this took
over from DTI (and LINK) as the main means to incentivize of business-
led R&D, running similar schemes including the sector targeted Bio-
medical Catalyst Fund (Owen and Hopkins, 2016).
LINK’s iteratively changing processes and commercially led grant
design can be regarded as indicative of tentative governance. It is not
clear that LINK has had much high-level political attention, but it has
been subject to departmental evaluation (BERR, 2008). DTI pro-
grammes that did not meet expectations were redesigned or scrapped
(as happened to SMART) demonstrating that commitment to these in-
struments is to some extent tentative. However, the technology-focused
nature of most programmes limits their breadth, and their frequent
sponsorship by research councils with narrow remit (e.g. medicine, or
biotechnology) also suggests these are definitively governed in as many
aspects as they are tentatively governed. The long existence of LINK and
growth in funding of collaborative R&D grants under Innovate UK,
rising to >1000 awards totalling >£200m per year by the late 2000s,
does suggest definitive commitment.6
4.3. Post-millennial interventions: the rise of industrial strategy
In the early 2000s with a generally benign economic context, hor-
izontal policies supporting public-private R&D links proliferated while
vertically targeted (sector-specific) or application-specific interventions
by the state were rare and modest in terms of financial commitments
(BERR, 2008). However, in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis
this began to change, with more interventionist, definitive governance
being used to provide continuity of funding for entrepreneurial firms in
technological fields identified to be of strategic importance for the
economy. The (Conservative) Government’s Minister for Universities
and Science at the time explicitly identified ‘Eight Great Technologies’
and set out to support them with a new “Industrial Strategy 101”, de-
spite his (and Thatcher’s) political party’s previous anti-industrial
strategy positon. He justified this change as follows:
“After the failure of the economic interventionism of the 1970s and the
triumph of the liberal revolution in economic policy of the 1980s we are
wary of Government trying to pick winners. … Until recently we have
tended to favour so- called ‘horizontal’ measures rather than ‘vertical’
ones which focus on particular sectors… Strong science and flexible
markets is a good combination of policies. But, like patriotism, it is not
enough. It misses out crucial stuff in the middle – real decisions on
backing key technologies on their journey from the lab to the market-
place. It is the missing third pillar to any successful high tech strategy. It is
R&D and technology and engineering as distinct from pure science. It is
our historic failure to back this which lies behind the familiar problems of
the so-called ‘valley of death’ between scientific discoveries and com-
mercial applications.” (David Willetts, 24th January 2013). 7
4 https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/science-
technology/stgmresearchcounciluksuppevi.pdf (accessed May 2018)
5 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20000824181734/http://
www.dti.gov.uk:80/comp/competitive/pdfs/wh_pdf7.pdf (accessed May 2018)
6 Full details of awards made after TSB (Innovate UK) was established are
available: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/innovate-uk-funded-
projects (accessed May 2018)
7 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmsctech/
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The gradual return of substantial government commitment to in-
dustrial strategy is successively more apparent in each of the following
three examples.
4.3.1. Technology-focused hybrid Capital funds8
The focus of this section is a new policy instrument, the High
Technology Fund of Funds (UKHTF) and its successor, the UK
Innovation Investment Fund (UKIIF). Intervening to directly boost a
market through providing capital for equity investment is a definitive
move in the key ‘allocation of resources’ governance niche (Hekkert
et al., 2007). After disappointing results in such direct interventions
(e.g. regional VC funds), “High Technology” focused equity finance by
government was delivered with some tentative measures to temper
definitive intensions.
In the late 1990s a series of reports (by the Bank of England, the
Confederation of British Industry (CBI),the House of Lords Science and
Technology Committee, and the government commissioned Williams
Report concluded that small UK technology firms still could not raise
capital sufficiently easily (Siepel, 2009). When the New Labour Gov-
ernment took power in 1997 there was further emphasise of the im-
portance of SMEs to the knowledge economy in the Government’s
Competitiveness White Paper (1998). A broad array of new policy in-
itiatives followed, including the commitment of £150m to a new En-
terprise Fund to be managed by the DTI, including the commitment to
fund UKHTF, which received £20m.
In common with several of the DTI’s other policy instruments the
UKHTF committed state funds alongside private capital in a manner in
which the public capital served as a risk-reduction or profit enhance-
ment measure for private investors thereby encouraging them to join a
market that would otherwise be underserved. These ‘hybrid funds’
combined public funds with private funds invested by commercial fund
managers. These efforts could be seen as a response to dissatisfaction
with state-managed VC funds, where the state invested directly in in-
vestee firms - often with poor results. This poor performance has been
attributed to the state’s failure to make commercial investment deci-
sions; a dissatisfaction that was experienced not just by the UK but by a
wide group of other countries that formed similar state managed VC
schemes (OECD, 2004). A number of features make hybrid funds an
attractive instrument for states. In particular, government can use hy-
brid funds to direct capital into the market for equity finance as deemed
necessary; they can change the fund design to moderate commercial
investor risk exposure as needed; they can choose whether to manage
investments actively or passively; they can choose which fund man-
agers to use, to direct where funds are invested (e.g. by geography or
sector). Early UK hybrid fund designs had a number of problems that
limited their effectiveness e.g. small fund size (with disproportionately
high management costs) or funds that competed with existing pools of
investors such as business angels rather than drawing capital into re-
maining ‘equity gaps’ - however there was substantial policy learning
following their sustained use (BVCA-NESTA, 2009).
UKHTF was set up in 2000, specifically to draw VCs into the equity
finance market for high tech firms and to demonstrate to the VC fund
managers that commercial returns could be made from UK high tech
firms. The £20m of public money committed to UKHTF attracted a
further £106m in private investment. The UKHTF was allowed to invest
up to £2m of state funding into each investee firm (a cap set to comply
with EU state aid rules). By 2006 the UKHTF had committed all of its
funding to investee firms and was soon found to be one of the more
successful of several hybrid fund models, despite being smaller than
comparative European funds (NAO, 2009, BVCA-NESTA, 2009; SQW
Consulting, 2009; BIS, 2011). Yet no additional state funding was
committed to this instrument until the global financial crisis.
In 2009 the UK Innovation Investment Fund (UKIIF), a new scheme
with £150m budget, took on a very similar design as part of a more of
definitive governance intervention in the equity finance market. This
attracted £180m in co-invested private capital (the lower ratio of
public to private capital compared to UKHTF reflecting the very diffi-
cult market for investment at the time). Funds were managed by an
expert commercial fund management company which could distribute
money to further VC funds, with investments made on equal terms to
those funds’ investors. In a departure from the design of prior instru-
ments, pre-determined targets were set for UKIIF funds to be invested in
key sectors, including £25m for the life sciences (BIS, 2012) – although
the Bioindustry Association, a lobby group for biotech SMEs, and life
sciences VC veteran Chris Evans lobbied unsuccessfully for a govern-
ment fund of up to £1Bn focused on life sciences in the wake of the
financial crisis.9 The UKIIF was well received by stakeholders for ad-
dressing a perceived equity gap in the investment market for high tech
firms at the £2m-£5m level. Yet it was also criticised for its rushed
implementation following pressure for action in the wake of the global
financial crisis (BIS, 2012).
To put UKHTF and UKIIF into perspective in the years 1999–2011,
over £1.1bn of UK government funding was pledged to hybrid funds in
order to attract £1.1bn in private funding together with an additional
£0.5bn from the European Regional Development Fund. These monies
were invested through more than 150 different individual funds in
support of a range of DTI policy instruments (Capital for Enterprise,
2012). Yet focusing just on UKHTF and UKIIF, these hybrid schemes
seem to have become more definitive.
Firstly, while UKHTF was not a priori targeted at specific sectors,
UKIIF was – with the purpose of supporting “key” sectors at a time of
crisis. The scale of support has also become more definitive, with much
larger sums invested in the 2009 round than in the 2000 round.
Moreover, the goals seem to have become more focused over time and
once money was awarded it was up to the fund managers to manage
investments. However hybrid funds management processes have ten-
tative characteristics: they have evolved considerably through learning
over time, driven in part by the high attention these schemes have at-
tracted from stakeholders (e.g. the British Venture Capital Association),
as well as the numerous studies of the evidence base for these inter-
ventions, and routine early and late-stage evaluations of their perfor-
mance. State management has become more ‘hands off’ with the UKIIF
funds-of-funds now overseen by a specially established state company,
Capital for Enterprise Ltd., rather than directly via a government de-
partment. Commitment has also been tentative in the sense that funding
was not committed in a continuous manner. The UKHTF scheme was
not re-funded immediately after its initial funding was allocated in
2006 nor was the UKIIF refunded after the conclusion of its most recent
round.
4.3.2. Technology innovation ‘Catapult’ centres
In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, the government in-
vested to further reinforce the link between knowledge creation and
entrepreneurial activities through the establishment of a network of
government funded specialist centres of technical and commercial ex-
pertise. The growing commitment to these centres and their top-down
management are definitive, but tentative governance is observed as the
(footnote continued)
619/619vw20.htm (Accessed August 14th 2017)
8 This section draws on material gathered from a comprehensive review of UK
entrepreneurial finance by Siepel (2009).
9 http://www.fiercebiotech.com/story/crisis-uk-bailout-biotech-industry/
2008-10-08 (Accessed July 20th, 2017) Evans was later successful in his efforts
to persuade the Welsh Government to support biotech firms with a £50m
Venture fund, which he became a manager of and used to invest in at least one
of his prior established companies. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-
politics-35654527 (accessed August 12th 2017).
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market plays a role too in determining the direction of investment.
High-tech entrepreneur Hermann Hauser led a government com-
missioned review on the potential role of Technology Innovation
Centres (TICs) in which he criticized the UK for having no national
strategy for the commercialization of its research, as well as generally
sub-critical levels of investment (Hauser, 2010:3). The report called for
the UK ‘to make choices and focus’ its investments in a network of TICs
to boost innovation in relation to emerging technologies where the UK
had strong capabilities and a sizable market opportunity to exploit
(Hauser, 2010:3). The TICs or Catapult Centres, as these became
known, can be thought of as a definitive intervention with sector-level
targeting and a substantial scale of investment. The initiative started
with a £200m investment in four centres with proponents aiming for
this to rise to 30 centres costing a combined £400m per year by 2030
(Hauser, 2014). Governance is definitive in the sense that the TICs’
mission and focus (on translational activities related to emerging
technologies) is fixed – modelled on the German Fraunhofer research
organisations.[1] The network is overseen centrally by Innovate UK
using a common evaluation process (E&Y, 2017).
Selected sectors benefit from substantial government investments
(£50m per 5 year term for each centre), sums that government intends
to be leveraged by commercial contracts. Within the network, centre
management teams are accountable to Innovate UK and the Department
for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. At present 10 centres are
in operation, including two biotech-focused centres (Cell and Gene
Therapy – opened in 2012, was just the 2nd in the network to open;
Medicines Discovery has been open less than a year at the time of
writing).
The definitive governance elements of the Catapults initiative are
tempered with tentative elements: Continued government support for
centres depends on regular evaluations of their progress e.g. Hauser
(2014); E&Y (2017). Each intervention is experimental in the sense that
there seems to be a real prospect of restructuring or closure (e.g. the
Precision Medicines Catapult was moved and merged with Medicines
Discovery Catapult at an early stage). The process to establish the
catapults drew on broad stakeholder consultation and evaluation in-
volves interviews with a wide range of stakeholders too. Moreover,
while catapults are supported by some core funding from the state, they
are expected to raise two-thirds of their budgets through competitive
bids and commercial tendering to ensure that they are focused and
market-led (E&Y, 2017).
4.3.3. Sector specific industrial strategy and sector deals
In recent years, definitive governance in support of biotech SMEs
has become a prominent, leading example of a new wave of UK state
interventionism in support of emerging technologies. This strategy
supports knowledge creation, allocates resources to support en-
trepreneurial activities and also seeks to legitimise/ lobby for the sector
creating a definitive policy support package for the sector. Yet tentative
elements still permit some flexibilities, notably through stakeholder
engagement and co-funding.
In the early 2000s, the BioIndustry Association, joined with
Government’s Department of Health and DTI in an initiative called the
Biosciences Innovation and Growth Team (BIGT) to deliver a report
(with foreword by Prime Minister Tony Blair) lobbying for resources in
support of the biotech sector. Bioscience, Innovation and Growth Team
(BIGT, 2003 led to a series of impacts over the next decade, mainly
implemented as horizontal policies by government. When the global
financial crisis weakened the UK’s entrepreneurial finance market, BIGT
wrote a second report in 2009 emphasising that biotech equity invest-
ment had ‘virtually ceased’ while suggesting that the sector was a ‘key
part of our knowledge based economy at risk’ (Bioscience, Innovation
and Growth Team (BIGT, 2009:2). Lobbying efforts led to the estab-
lishment of targeted state investments (including part of UKHTF –
discussed above).
The BIGT’s warnings led to the establishment of a cross-
departmental Office of Life Sciences (OLS), with a mission to co-ordi-
nate government policy support efforts for the sector (BIS, 2010). The
OLS was soon inherited by the new coalition Liberal-Conservative
government in 2010 (replacing New Labour). The next year, when
Pfizer (a large pharmaceutical firm) brought a damaging blow to UK life
sciences by threatening closure of a major R&D site in 2011, OLS lead a
rapid government response – a Life Sciences Strategy, launched by
Prime Minister, David Cameron.
The multi-faceted strategy included vertical funding instruments
such as the Biomedical Catalyst fund (administered by Innovate UK),
launched in 2011 with a budget of £180m – subsequently refunded
with another £110m in 2016.10 The political importance of the sector
was further underlined in 2014 by the appointment of a dedicated
government Minister for Life Sciences, George Freeman, to oversee the
work of the OLS – Freeman was a former VC with experience the sector
(Owen and Hopkins, 2016).
Meanwhile at the national level, there was continued poor pro-
ductivity growth in the economy. The government commissioned a
review to explore further policy interventions. The review, No stone
unturned, led by Lord Heseltine, produced many recommendations
(which were mostly accepted), including the proposed development of
a national industrial strategy with commitment to co-create industrial
strategies with 11 sectors to boost economic performance (Heseltine,
2013; Her Majesty’s Treasury and Department for Business, 2013).
However, the industrial strategy was not published until after another
landscape-level shock to the economy – the result of the UK’s 2016
referendum on leaving the EU.
In the face of considerable Brexit-related economic uncertainty,
Prime Minister Theresa May suggested that the new UK industrial
strategy ‘epitomises my belief in a strong and strategic state that in-
tervenes decisively where ever it can make a difference’ (HM
Government, 2017a:4). Sector champions were nominated to work with
industry to develop actions, including to ‘make the UK the best place in
the world to invest in life sciences’ (HM Government, 2017a:102). Thus,
a second Life Sciences Industrial Strategy was commissioned by gov-
ernment, again largely co-ordinated by the OLS but this time led by an
Oxford academic with industry experience, Professor Sir John Bell.
Published in Autumn 2017, its relationship to the 2011 Life Sciences
Industrial Strategy is unclear. The 2017 strategy set out a number of
goals including some very specific expected outcomes – such as to sti-
mulate the emergence of new industries and to build four businesses
with a market cap of £20Bn in the next decade (Bell, 2017). The gov-
ernment moved quickly to resource Bell’s strategy with the publication
of a Life Sciences Sector Deal, in late 2017. The Life Sciences Sector
Deal (2017b) includes state commitments worth over £400m. This
includes a series of new specialist research centres and grant competi-
tions to develop capabilities and projects related to new methods for
manufacturing medicines (£162m) and early diagnostics and precision
medicine (£210m). These investments are promised alongside industry
commitments worth >£250m to build new facilities for R&D and
manufacturing in the UK in a carefully coordinated series of an-
nouncements, managed to gain maximum media attention.
The Life Sciences Strategy (2011), The Industrial Strategy (Her
Majesty’s Government, 2017a), Life Sciences Industrial Strategy (Bell,
2017) and Industrial Strategy Life Sciences Sector Deal (HM
Government, 2017b) provide targeted, sizable and sustained financial
commitments making these definitive governance interventions in
several respects. The goals (as set out in the sector’s 2017 Industrial
Strategy) are precise, explicit and extensive – and so also potentially
quite definitive. It remains to be seen whether these will stay un-
changed in the future though. Indeed the planning and implementation
(including time scale/ milestones) for both the 2011 and 2017 Life
10 https://www.bioindustry.org/uploads/assets/uploaded/3b1adf21-0a72-
4594-b2680f04846f2989.pdf
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Science industrial strategies has been characterised as insufficient
(House of Lords S&T Committee 2018).
Although the 2017 strategy sets out some timescales suggesting
objectives are mainly to be met in 5–10 years (Bell, 2017: 3) – this is not
a particularly long period of support given the ambitions set out in the
strategy. Although it is rather early to classify the evolving processes of
governance around the industrial strategy, we note that details (parti-
cularly on leadership, evaluation and some other aspects including
more funding in the future) are still emerging. Furthermore, stern cri-
ticism has already been made of the strategy indicating that current
processes are seen as ‘wholly inadequate’ (House of Lords 2018:3). With
both processes and timescales underdeveloped and emerging, it seems
these are perhaps more tentative than definitive. Finally, stakeholder
engagement has been extensive but fast paced and also somewhat se-
cretive. Furthermore, because the sector deal has emphasised the need
for industry co-creation and co-funding, there is a tendency for larger
firms to be given more prominence, and so the policy targeting is open
to incumbents’ influence. The potential for governance capture here is
concerning, particularly in light of prior policies introduced after in-
dustry lobbying, such as the Cancer Drugs Fund (established in 2010)
which was criticized for paying £1.3Bn to established pharmaceutical
firms for certain expensive drugs of limited effectiveness (Aggarwall
et al., 2017).11
5. Discussion and conclusions
By exploring the governance of six prominent policy instruments
shaping the UK’s entrepreneurial capital market for therapeutic biotech
firms, we demonstrate how tentative and definitive governance modes
can be analysed and show how they are used to support the growth of
an industry characterized by an emerging technology. In this section we
discuss the three main contributions of the paper which address our
research questions, followed by some observations that are apparent
from the context studied. Finally some limitations of our approach are
noted.
Our first contribution has been to address the question of how to
unpack tentative and definitive governance to facilitate application of
these concepts at the level of the policy instrument. To achieve this we
use a simple expository framework to delineate relevant governance
actions in the domain of interest, and to indicate how actions can be
characterised along a spectrum from tentative to definitive in a series of
seven dimensions. These dimensions are: the choice of governance ni-
ches, the targeting of beneficiaries, changes in implementation pro-
cesses, scale of resource committed to the intervention, the temporal
duration of commitment, changes to the goals of the intervention, and
the range and position of stakeholders involved in formulation of the
governance action.
The analysis of Section 4, concerning six policy initiatives affecting
the financing of R&D in the biotech sector is summarised in Table 3 and
clearly shows that our framework can be operationalised. Table 3
summarizes the key aspects of the six selected policy instruments to
support analysis.
First, Table 3 highlights that our selected governance interventions
range from the comprehensive, addressing many parts of an innovation
system (more definitive), as the Life Sciences Industrial Strategy shows,
to those that are limited to a single governance niche (more tentative).
Second, it shows that our selected governance interventions include
horizontal (non-specific) policies that cover many sectors – not just
those of emerging technologies as well as vertical (sector specific) ones,
the latter policies being perhaps more easy to miss by those undertaking
sector specific studies. Third, we show that the governance processes
are mainly managed in a way that allows learning and redesign, rather
than unchanging processes formed definitively at the outset. The fourth
and fifth dimensions of the table summarise the details of the scale and
duration of commitment to policies, which may be large and un-
wavering in definitive governance (in the case of EIS and VCT) or ex-
perimental, preliminary and contingent, for tentative governance (as in
the case of technology-focused hybrid capital funds). Sixthly, the table
summarises our analysis of the goals and whether they are adaptable or
immutable, and whether progress against these goals is monitored, for
example by use of key performance indicators for Catapult Centres – or
perhaps more loosely followed. The Seventh dimension of Table 3
shows how, in tentative cases, stakeholder engagement can be trans-
parent, long term and extensive (as has been the case around invest-
ment oriented tax incentive schemes) or more closed but still nego-
tiated. Finally, the structural position of those in the state involved in
governance actions is noted. Our analysis detailed that departments,
such as HM Treasury, were often ambivalent about the fate of particular
sectors or emerging technologies, and may tend towards tentative ac-
tions (for example, recall in UK there has been a fear of civil servants
and politicians making a poor job of ‘picking winners’). However some
arms of the state are more sector-focused, such as OLS, and may be
more inclined to support definitive actions in aid of those within their
domain.
Our second contribution has been to examine how coherently ten-
tative and definitive governance modes are used in practice, and to
show that tentative and definitive governance modes are often blended.
Table 3 assigns one of four grades to each dimension of each policy
instrument: (i) tentative, (ii) more tentative than definitive (iii) more
definitive than tentative and (iv) definitive. From this grading (and
associated shading in Table 3 it is immediately apparent that definitive
and tentative governance elements are discernible throughout the time
period studied and occur in combination in all the instruments studied.
It seems that UK policy makers in this field have rarely been minded to
be wholly tentative or definitive when developing policy instruments –
perhaps in the tradition of Lindblom (1959).
Our analysis shows how definitive policies that might at first appear
too rigid to critics were often made more flexible and responsive to
uncertain circumstances. For example in the case of Celltech, an in-
tervention that was at first substantially at odds with a new govern-
ment’s ideology, was reshaped through the introduction for more ten-
tative elements until what seemed at first to be a definitive action
became a short period of government ownership during a start-up
phase, pending privatization. This example also shows that seemingly
definitive support measures may be reversed by the determined policy
maker (assuming they are willing to see sunk investments at risk). In
other cases, such as the BSS (later EIS) tax break for investors or the
collaborative R&D LINK scheme, experimentalism has become routi-
nized as support actions are launched, refined, and relaunched amid
policy learning processes – allowing long term support to be maintained
for policy interventions that can be justified by their effectiveness. Most
recently with the Life Sciences Industrial Strategy and Life Sciences
Sector Deal, the state seems to have placed greater emphasis on defi-
nitive rather than tentative governance commitments in order to create
certainty when deemed necessary, to reassert a positive narrative for
the sector during a time of uncertainty. Yet at the same time tentative
elements have been used in some dimensions of policy planning and
design, often those associated with consultation and learning.
Kuhlmann et al. (2019) note that the concept of tentative govern-
ance has great value because it is neutral, without any single purpose or
expected outcome. And that the concept of tentativeness comes from,
but is distinct from other previously defined concepts that emphasize
notions such as reflexiveness (shaping innovation), anticipatory (for-
ward looking along a particular path); adaptive (related to learning),
distributed (multilateral); experimental, and explorative. Our analysis
in Section 4 and its summary in Table 3, supports Kuhlmann et al.’s
assertion that seeing definitive governance in a neutral manner is more
valuable that trying to allocate actions to one of the many possible
boxes, at least when considering its role in these policies reviewed here.11 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-39711137 (accessed July 20th, 2017).
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For example, we see cases where the tentative dimensions of govern-
ance were related to the desire to learn (experimental or adaptive) – as
with UK tax incentives, but also sometimes they were related to paci-
fying actors with different attitudes to the policy intervention as in the
case of Celltech. And whilst some kinds of tentative were clearly de-
sirous for shaping innovations and were very directional (such as with
LINK or Catapults), others were simply tentative in a more pragmatic
manner to get some kind of movement, not necessarily in any particular
direction (as with the tax incentive schemes for investors). In short, we
suggest that “tentativeness” is not just an umbrella concept that in-
cludes others, but in the context of UK biotech, it is also useful in
characterising what is going on.
A third contribution relates to the use of tentative and definitive
governance over time – with particular attention to the emergence of an
industry associated with a new technology. Our findings suggest that
tentative and definitive governance practices can be found throughout
the process of technology and market emergence. Taking all dimensions
from all instruments together, Tables 2 and 3 shows a shift back to-
wards more definitive governance interventions (favoured in the1970s
in the UK but not in the 1980s) – but this is largely because these in-
struments have been selected as examples to illustrate this trend, which
is described elsewhere (Owen and Hopkins, 2016). That same trend is
further evidenced by the statements of Hauser, Willetts and May ex-
hibited in Section 4. However these statements illustrate a shift in the
broader economy and not in governance of the biotech sector per se.
This evidence should not be used to support a model whereby tentative
or definitive governance is associated with particular stages of tech-
nological emergence, and if there were such an effect it likely is sub-
ordinate to landscape influences. Instead we note that at the macro-
economic level, a period of low productivity growth in the wake of the
2008 global financial crisis led to interventionist government responses
in a range of industrial sectors selected by the state for special support.
State support was delivered through redoubled efforts using established
polices (e.g. hybrid funding schemes) as well as new sector-level co-
ordinated action (e.g. sector deals). This was a turning of the tide in
political culture, as before then, there had been a broad shift (inter-
nationally) away from certain types of industrial policy interventions
tried in the past and now expected to have less success in highly un-
certain emerging technologies such as biotechnology as compared to,
for example, electronics (Wong, 2011).
We therefore conclude that tentative and definitive governance are
both used by the state irrespective of the political ideology of the party
in power with respect to market interventionism - echoing Birch’s ar-
gument that neoliberalism may be difficult to adhere to in practice
(Birch, 2015). Furthermore, some of the cases show that governance is
influenced by lobbies that can create a sense of urgency around action,
and also that the overall economic outlook can spur definitive policy
action. Our findings therefore suggest that theorising around tentative
and definitive governance should take these factors into account. Fi-
nally, we demonstrate that tentative governance appears to have broad
relevance, being frequently used in the context studied as a pragmatic
response to the need to act definitively while taking specific stakeholder
concerns or uncertainties into account.
Following from the above contributions, some further observations
can be made on governance practices in relation to emerging technol-
ogies. First, something that can hamper governance is the tendency of
one group of actors to be disengaged in a niche even as another is en-
gaged (an either/or relationship). At such times, capabilities for gov-
ernance (through investment and learning effects) can move out of sync
with one another, reducing or delaying potentially fruitful co-ordina-
tion. For example this happened in the UK when stock market investors
disengaged from biotech investing and the state chose to increase its
interventions to support the sector. We also note that at any one time,
different parts of government can have differing stances – for example
definitive governance modes may be used by one arm, while tentative
approaches are used by others. Under favourable conditions, the state
may appear to have a choice between being active or more passive in its
governance role. However, if conditions deteriorate, the state’s unique
capabilities to shape markets, and consequently the social distribution
of other actors’ risks and rewards (Moss, 2002), make it politically
difficult to resist intervening.
Secondly, to encourage investors to engage with an emerging sector,
co-investment has been repeatedly deployed (e.g. in the cases of
Celltech, LINK grants, hybrid VC funds, and the Life Sciences Sector
Deal). In these cases private investment is secured for particular sectors,
or application areas, with the state moderating commercial risk by in-
vesting along-side private investors as well as providing other in-
centives. The state has tried to establish a commercially-led market
with minimal state involvement whenever possible, consistent with (the
contextually predominant) free market thinking. However, market
failure has been a recurrent challenge. In the early 1980s small amounts
of funding were needed to establish the UK’s first dedicated biotech
firms. The moves to support markets for entrepreneurial finance
through horizontal tax incentives was a tentative scheme that simply
led to investors sheltering their money in lower-risk assets in return for
their tax break. High risk, long duration investments with unproven
returns have proven to be less than tempting to private investors –
except during relatively short periods of techno-hype. Hence the need
for more direct incentives to encourage investment which, although we
do not evaluate their effectiviness here, have been noted to be difficult
to deploy successfully (Lerner, 2009).
Finally, this account offers insight into the effects of tentative gov-
ernance on co-ordination efforts which are an important influence in
national systems of innovation (Biopolis, 2007; Kooiman, 1993; Lyall
and Tait, 2005). On the one hand opening-up policy processes to ten-
tative governance can be beneficial, but on the other hand, openness to
stakeholder input in policy design can also allow incumbents to further
entrench their positions and for path dependency to dominate. Ex-
amples quoted here show incumbent influence on policy in financial
services and for life sciences, particularly with regard to the large
pharmaceutical firms. This is a trend that has tracked the emergence of
the sector and the establishment of sizeable markets for equity finance
in the UK. As the sector became more important to VC, pharmaceutical
firms and to the government’s economic ambitions, lobbying for more
definitive governance measures appears to have become more effective.
This lobbying has also, unsurprisingly, coincided with growing eco-
nomic stress for the sectors involved. Incumbent actors may act in ways
that lead to lock-in (Arthur, 1989), such as closing down options that do
not favour them, potentially leading to socially suboptimal outcomes
(Ramjerdi and Fearnley, 2014). In extremis, regulatory capture may
occur with governance actions favouring sectional interests over the
public interest (Dal Bó, 2006).
We find that tentative governance can be employed in a wide range
of circumstances as a way of managing the uncertainties (including but
certainly not limited to technological emergence) but it may be difficult
to maintain in the face of organized lobbies for established interests and
exogenous shocks such as deteriorating economic conditions.
Limitations of this research
Long term studies of changes in governance have limitations that
are reflected in this work. Firstly,
in the study of tentative governance, the longer the time period
studied, the more likely it is that flexibility or reversals may observed
(and so governance may retrospectively appear to be more tentative in
the long run than it appeared a short while after the events took place).
Secondly, understanding whether tentative or definitive governance is
successful in achieving its objectives depends on knowing ex-ante goals,
baselines, outcomes and whether those outcomes were achieved and if
so the extent to which the policy design was influential in this. In some
cases interventions are fully evaluated ex-post (such as BSS, BES, EIS,
VCT, LINK) in an open and transparent manner. However, while it has
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been possible to demonstrated various ways in which policy actions can
be made more tentative or more definitive, we have not provided an
evaluation of impacts that stem from the choice of governance mode.
Nor have we been able to fully determine whether outcomes were more
or less effective as a result of these practices or whether any positive
outcomes were intentional or incidental to the policy design. It is ap-
parent though that despite the interventions described here, recent a
policy report suggest that the UK market for entrepreneurial finance
remains a work in progress (HM Treasury, 2017).
Another key limitation is that this account focuses on state gov-
ernance actions and ignores non-state actors. This is partly to do with
space but also because it is more difficult to access detailed data on non-
state interventions. Our empirical evidence also does not cover im-
portant activities undertaken by established pharmaceutical firms,
many of whom were actively exploring biotechnology in the period
covered by the analysis. Similarly, the actions of medical research
charities and other third sector actors are not explored even though
some, like the Wellcome Trust, are of high significance in the UK
context.
Finally, while a focus on a single sector within a single national
context over a long period of time is informative about the relationships
between tentative and definitive modes of governance, other aspects
and dimensions beyond those studied here may be found to be analy-
tically informative in other countries or sectors and at other times. The
exploratory account provided here leaves much room for room for
further research on the effectiveness of governance modes that include
a wider range of countries, sectors, and actors.
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